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INTRODUCTION 
Scholars, lawyers, and, indeed, the public at large increasingly worry 
about what purposive presidential inaction1 in enforcing2 statutory programs 
means for the rule of law and how such discretionary inaction can fit within 
a constitutional structure that compels Presidents to “take Care that the Laws 
be faithfully executed.”3 Concerns about the excessive use of this kind of 
discretion to refrain from enforcement extend back to the constitutional 
debates, as historically oriented scholarship has now shown.4 The Take Care 
Clause appears to have been more or less an explicit effort to disclaim the 
“dispensing” and “suspension” powers that the King of England claimed for 
himself leading up to the Glorious Revolution.5 But the issue has become 
more immediately relevant in the wake of several high-profile instances where 
the Obama Administration announced prospective nonenforcement policies 
on immigration, health care, and marijuana, among other things.6 Critics 
 
1 By “purposive presidential inaction,” I mean a President’s or an agency’s intentional decision to 
refrain from exercising enforcement authority granted to the Executive by Congress. I do not address 
a separate, but related, problem involving Presidents’ signing statements or refusals to act on laws they 
believe are unconstitutional. See generally Dawn E. Johnsen, Presidential Non-Enforcement of 
Constitutionally Objectionable Statutes, 63 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 7 (2000). Purposive executive 
inaction, as used in this Article, refers only to the President’s or an agency’s refusal to enforce 
constitutionally valid statutory programs. 
2 I use “enforcing” in a broad sense. It is not restricted to enforcement of statutory 
requirements against individuals (i.e., adjudication or prosecution); rather, it refers to following 
through on statutory obligations. For instance, if the obligation is a deadline to promulgate rules or to 
act on a nondiscretionary duty, I consider failure to adhere to that deadline to be “nonenforcement.” 
3 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3. 
4 See Robert J. Delahunty & John C. Yoo, Dream On: The Obama Administration’s 
Nonenforcement of Immigration Laws, the DREAM Act, and the Take Care Clause, 91 TEX. L. REV. 781, 
796-803 (2013) (discussing the historical background of and the founding debates on executive power 
and the President’s duty to enforce the law); Zachary S. Price, Enforcement Discretion and Executive 
Duty, 67 VAND. L. REV. 671, 724-30 (2014) (presenting evidence that “confirms that the executive 
function has long been understood to entail some degree of discretion with respect to enforcement 
of statutory prohibitions”). 
5 See Price, supra note 4, at 731 (“[I]t seems unlikely that early executive officials would have 
believed they held broad authority to decline enforcement of federal statutes.”). 
6 See Peter Margulies, The Boundaries of Executive Discretion: Deferred Action, Unlawful Presence, 
and Immigration Law, 64 AM. U. L. REV. 1183, 1184-1203 (2015) (providing background on immigration 
nonenforcement in the Obama Administration); Price, supra note 4, at 759-61 (highlighting the 
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deftly lay out several problems with this trend: it appears to be somewhat 
inconsistent with the original intent of the Framers;7 it has been conducted 
mostly covertly, with little in the way of transparency and accountability;8 
and, perhaps worst of all, depending on one’s political priors, it entrenches a 
reactive bias in policymaking,9 particularly when divided government and 
legislative gridlock make it nearly impossible to develop new regulatory 
programs the old-fashioned way through new legislation or even new 
regulations.10 The issue is also now far more vexing, insofar as the ubiquity of 
law and endemic budgetary crises make some degree of government inaction 
both inevitable and desirable. Most agree that the President should have the 
authority to decline to enforce the law in certain situations where equity or 
resource constraints prevent full enforcement of the law.11 But instances of 
policy-oriented nonenforcement—i.e., the purposive use of presidential 
nonenforcement to accomplish policy changes that would not be possible 
through the normal channels of legislation—are more controversial. Some 
now argue that this kind of exercise of executive discretion is not the kind of 
thing the Constitution permits or the kind of thing we ought to encourage as 
a matter of good governance.12 
This Article challenges those writing and practicing in the area of 
presidential inaction to ask and answer a difficult question that inevitably 
follows: What role can and should courts assume in addressing potentially 
 
Department of Homeland Security’s nonenforcement of certain immigration laws); see also Timothy 
Stoltzfus Jost & Simon Lazarus, Obama’s ACA Delays—Breaking the Law or Making It Work?, 370 
NEW ENG. J. MED. 1970 (2014) (discussing the Obama Administration’s postponement of 
implementation of certain provisions of the Affordable Care Act); Bradley E. Markano, Enabling State 
Deregulation of Marijuana Through Executive Branch Nonenforcement, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 289, 292-96 
(2015) (explaining the Obama Administration’s decisions regarding nonenforcement of marijuana laws). 
7 See Delahunty & Yoo, supra note 4, at 803 (describing the Founders’ intent to eliminate, or at 
least limit, the President’s discretionary authority through the Take Care Clause); Price, supra note 
4, at 731 (outlining the origins of the Take Care Clause, which suggest that early American thinking 
revealed no executive authority to decline to enforce federal statutes). 
8 See Kate Andrias, The President’s Enforcement Power, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1031, 1101 (2013) 
(proposing to reform presidential enforcement through heightened coordination and disclosure). 
9 See Jeffrey A. Love & Arpit K. Garg, Presidential Inaction and the Separation of Powers, 112 
MICH. L. REV. 1195, 1237-50 (2014) (examining the implications of presidential inaction, particularly 
a bias in favor of small government). 
10 See Abbe R. Gluck, Anne Joseph O’Connell & Rosa Po, Unorthodox Lawmaking, Unorthodox 
Rulemaking, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1789, 1828-30 (2015) (discussing the ways that gridlock in the 
legislative process leads to work-around practices in Congress and agencies). 
11 See Delahunty & Yoo, supra note 4, at 785 (arguing that the President’s strict duty to enforce the 
law “is ‘defeasible,’ and its nonperformance can be excused or justified in appropriate circumstances”). 
12 See id. at 784 (“We argue that the Constitution’s Take Care Clause imposes on the President 
a duty to enforce all constitutionally valid acts of Congress in all situations and cases.”); see also Love 
& Garg, supra note 9, at 1203 (suggesting that engaging in unchecked inaction “results in a bias 
toward smaller government that our conventional concept of checks and balances does not tolerate 
and cannot counter”). 
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unconstitutional presidential inaction? While there are of course some 
constitutional problems that have been entrusted to the oversight of only the 
political process,13 ordinarily, where there is a constitutional problem, courts 
play at least some role in addressing it.14 However, those who have identified 
policy-oriented presidential inaction as a problem have yet to offer any 
workable judicial rule or standard to address that problem. Some have 
articulated constitutional rules that could, in principle, be applied by the 
courts,15 but, in practice, would wreak such havoc on the judiciary that even 
their proponents recognize that they are unlikely to be seriously 
implemented.16 Other scholars have urged political process reforms that 
would serve to manage presidential power in these areas but steer far away 
from any judicial remedy.17 
There are two major problems with constitutional review of a President’s 
compliance with the Take Care Clause, both of which are implicit in scholars’ 
reluctance to assign a role to the courts. First, such review would invite an 
overwhelming number of complaints and would be subject to such difficult 
line-drawing problems that courts would, in effect, be forced to make their 
review either exceedingly lenient or exceedingly stringent simply to curb the 
demand for review. Neither situation would be ideal, since Presidents 
inevitably need to make highly contextual choices about priorities and 
resource allocation, and they clearly can abuse that discretion at times. A rigid 
rule would be either overinclusive or underinclusive, and a flexible standard 
would be impossible to administer, given the prevalence of nonenforcement 
decisions in the modern administrative state. Second, even if courts were able 
to surmount these institutional capacity hurdles and find a suitable 
constitutional rule or standard, they would still be unlikely to actually affect 
executive nonenforcement discretion in any meaningful way. Presidents are 
not typically constrained by courts or Congress in separation-of-powers 
disputes because, in the particulars of administration, they possess far greater 
expertise, nimbleness, and even accountability than the other branches. Since 
Congress and the courts are aware of their own limitations in this regard, they 
are inherently hesitant to intervene in anything remotely resembling core 
executive tasks, such as decisions about when to enforce the law.18 
 
13 See generally Jane S. Schacter, Ely at the Altar: Political Process Theory Through the Lens of the 
Marriage Debate, 109 MICH. L. REV. 1363 (2011) (discussing and applying political process theory). 
14 See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) (“It is emphatically the province 
and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.”). 
15 See infra Section I.A. 
16 See infra Section I.A. 
17 See infra Section I.B. 
18 See Mary M. Cheh, When Congress Commands a Thing to Be Done: An Essay on Marbury v. 
Madison, Executive Inaction, and the Duty of the Courts to Enforce the Law, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 
253, 255 (2003) (“Even in the face of modern translation difficulties, and despite the factual and 
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Given these barriers to developing an appropriate judicial response on the 
constitutional level, we would do well to avoid reinventing the wheel. In fact, 
we can avoid it. As a practical matter, challenges to the exercise of 
nonenforcement discretion are ordinarily posed as challenges to agency 
inaction. The President may involve himself more in some agency decisions 
than others, but ultimately, he can act only through agencies, which are in 
turn subject to suit under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).19 Thus, 
even disputes about nonenforcement going to the heart of the President’s 
agenda are typically posed as, or are easily translatable into, an administrative 
law problem rather than a constitutional law problem.20 As it turns out—and 
as I will demonstrate in this Article—administrative law has not turned a 
blind eye to the problems identified in this new wave of scholarship. Rather, 
it has developed an elaborate, often quite nuanced, and ultimately effective 
approach to dealing with the institutional problems associated with judicial 
policing of executive nonenforcement. Courts, in reviewing agency inaction 
under the APA, in effect “translate”21 constitutional values in particular cases 
through a form of review that leaves them both far less vulnerable to an 
unmanageable caseload and far more capable of competing with Presidents in 
the most important cases. Jurisdictional safety valves—such as the requirement 
of final agency action and doctrines of prudential standing—as well as 
complexities of administrative law doctrine allow courts to be selective in 
filtering out routine nonenforcement cases in ways not possible if they were 
 
procedural limitations in the case itself, Marbury’s core message remains clear and powerful: 
pursuant to constitutional or statutory commands, the executive has the obligation to act within the 
law, and the courts have the duty to enforce the law. Yet, although the general principle that the 
president is obligated to follow congressional commands has not seriously been called into question, 
the courts have, nonetheless, not always fulfilled their duty to enforce that obligation.”); Peter L. 
Strauss, Presidential Rulemaking, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 965, 983 (1997) (arguing that the “President 
as lawmaker” is dangerous “precisely because he is omnicompetent, remote from effective check by 
courts or even Congress”). 
19 See Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551–59 (2012) (providing standards for the 
promulgation and enforcement of regulations); id. § 702 (conferring a private right of action to 
enforce federal rights against agencies). 
20 Love and Garg appear to argue that, although administrative law scholars have long engaged 
the question of “presidential policymaking through inaction,” none have ever dealt with the 
“constitutional dimensions of the problem.” Love & Garg, supra note 9, at 1210. This is hair-splitting: 
in fact, the problems are virtually identical, and to the extent that there are unique “constitutional 
dimensions” to the policy problem, it is not apparent what they are. When it comes to enforcement 
of the constitutional norm, however, important differences do arise, and the choice to treat the 
problem as constitutional or statutory requires serious attention. See infra Part III. 
21 Cf. ERIC A. POSNER & ADRIAN VERMEULE, THE EXECUTIVE UNBOUND: AFTER THE 
MADISONIAN REPUBLIC 84 (2010) (citing Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity in Translation, 71 TEX. L. REV. 
1165 (1993)) (introducing the idea of “translation” in noting that procedural statutes like the APA 
can “translate” the principles and values underlying separation of powers into a world where agencies 
have increased authority). 
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applying a freestanding constitutional analysis under the Take Care Clause.22 
Allowing courts to selectively review presidential nonenforcement discretion 
in turn enables them to carry more authority when they do intervene.23 In 
short, an administrative law approach to the root problem of nonenforcement 
is far better poised to actually make a difference. 
This is not to say that an administrative law approach to the constitutional 
problem is perfect. Much more work remains to hone the doctrine and bring 
it into accord with the nascent constitutional values implicated in this 
debate.24 But it is a start, and one that I argue carves out an attractive and 
institutionally feasible method for courts seeking to navigate the middle ground 
between the extremes of separation-of-powers formalism and open-ended 
functional balancing. Recognizing how APA review of agency inaction works 
to optimally reduce presidential nonenforcement discretion speaks to the 
important ongoing debate about what to do with policy-oriented presidential 
inaction. We need not settle on untested political process reforms—such as 
encouraging presidential coordination and disclosure of nonenforcement 
decisions, or nudging Congress to write more specific statutes25—which are 
unlikely to take hold or to constrain the exercise of nonenforcement 
discretion.26 
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I reviews the burgeoning debate 
around purposive presidential inaction, recounting the formal and functional 
reasons that constitutional separation-of-powers scholars have come to doubt 
the constitutionality and desirability of the practice. Part II articulates the 
 
22 See infra subsection III.B.2. 
23 See infra Part IV. 
24 See Lisa Schultz Bressman, Judicial Review of Agency Inaction: An Arbitrariness Approach, 79 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1657, 1662 (2004) (attempting to “place administrative law back inside the universe 
of basic constitutional design and purpose” and noting that the “issue of agency inaction” in fact 
“can be reconceived as consistent with other constitutional doctrines”). One unresolved problem 
that deserves attention in this respect is the ongoing debate over whether naked political reasons for 
agency action are sufficient to survive arbitrary and capricious review. See generally Kathryn A. 
Watts, Proposing a Place for Politics in Arbitrary and Capricious Review, 119 YALE L.J. 2 (2009) (arguing 
for a relaxation of arbitrary and capricious review under the APA to accept political reasons as 
legitimate justifications for agency decisions). This Article does not deal with this issue. However, 
after committing the APA approach to the problem of nonenforcement, it will be necessary to sort 
out these kinds of open questions about the appropriate time for court intervention. 
25 See Andrias, supra note 8, at 1083-94 (proposing executive coordination reforms on the 
grounds of efficiency and democratic accountability); Love & Garg, supra note 9, at 1244-49 
(proposing multiple means by which Congress could work around presidential inaction, including 
by passing more specific laws). 
26 Congress itself may not be up to the challenge and may have no interest in ensuring that 
the enacting Congress’s intent is enforced. See Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. 
L. REV. 2245, 2250-52 (2001) (discussing how the current Congress may have an interest in 
promoting “lawlessness” in agencies, necessitating some role for the courts in controlling political 
influence on the implementation of law in agencies). 
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problem with this growing consensus: there has been too little attention paid 
to the role that courts might have to play in addressing problematic uses of 
presidential inaction. Most importantly, efforts to invigorate the Take Care 
Clause have been too inattentive to the strains on judicial capacity that would 
be posed by such a development. Part III offers an argument that the 
administrative law of agency inaction is better suited to take on the difficult 
questions surrounding nonenforcement. Such review could do the work that 
blunter constitutional instruments and the political process cannot do alone, 
all while insulating courts from strains on their institutional capacity. Finally, 
Part IV reviews three important recent federal court decisions, each 
demonstrating how courts are conducting APA review to translate 
constitutional separation-of-powers values through a review framework that 
better serves the courts in their efforts to police presidential inaction. 
I. THE DEBATE OVER PRESIDENTIAL NONENFORCEMENT 
DISCRETION 
By all accounts, recent Presidents have made extensive use of 
nonenforcement discretion to further their policy visions. President Obama’s 
decisions to defer removal action for certain undocumented immigrants,27 not 
to enforce rulemaking and compliance deadlines under the Affordable Care 
Act,28 and not to enforce federal marijuana control laws in states where 
marijuana is legalized29 all brought the practice to unprecedented public 
exposure, with Republicans in Congress accusing the President of acting 
above the law.30 In fact, though, President George W. Bush’s nonenforcement 
 
27 See Memorandum from Jeh Charles Johnson, Sec’y of Homeland Sec., to Leon Rodriguez, 
Dir., U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Servs., Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion with Respect to 
Individuals Who Came to the United States as Children and with Respect to Certain Individuals Who 
Are the Parents of U.S. Citizens or Permanent Residents 3 (Nov. 20, 2014), http://www.dhs.gov/
sites/default/files/publications/14_1120_memo_deferred_action.pdf [https://perma.cc/3JYG-RAET] 
(“I am now expanding . . . case-by-case use of deferred action for those adults who have been in this 
country since January 1, 2010, are the parents of U.S. citizens or lawful permanent residents, and who 
are otherwise not enforcement priorities . . . .”). 
28 See Memorandum from Steven Larsen, Dir., Office of Consumer Info. & Ins. Oversight, 
U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Insurance Standards Guidance Series—Information 1 (Dec. 
9, 2010), https://www.cms.gov/CCIIO/Resources/Regulations-and-Guidance/Downloads/guidance-
limited-benefit-2nd-supp-bulletin-120910.pdf [https://perma.cc/B69F-7FM6] (discussing the 
requirements for “waiver[s] for a limited benefit plan or ‘mini-med’ plan of the restrictions on the 
imposition of annual limits on the dollar value of essential health benefits”). 
29 See Memorandum from James M. Cole, Deputy Attorney Gen., to U.S. Attorneys, 
Guidance Regarding Marijuana Enforcement 3 (Aug. 29, 2013), https://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/
resources/3052013829132756857467.pdf [https://perma.cc/AF5H-UAGP] (focusing marijuana-based 
enforcement on certain policy priorities). 
30 See generally Senator Ted Cruz, The Obama Administration’s Unprecedented Lawlessness, 38 
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 63 (2015) (critiquing President Obama’s use of discretionary authority). 
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of certain environmental programs—most famously, the “Clear Skies 
program”—amounts to the same basic strategic maneuver for deregulatory 
purposes, as did intended deregulatory programs in antitrust and 
environmental law during the Reagan Administration.31 As political scientists 
have long understood and legal scholars have begun to recognize, Presidents 
of all ideological stripes have enormous incentives to accomplish something 
while they are in office.32 And, in an age of divided government, polarization, 
and the inevitable gridlock that these conditions foretell, it is far easier for 
Presidents to use nonenforcement discretion than it is to push new initiatives 
through the veto-gated legislative process.33 
But just because the tactic has long been employed by Presidents34 does 
not mean that nonenforcement is constitutional or that it amounts to good 
governance. The high-profile instances of purposive presidential inaction 
during the Obama Administration have stoked an important debate among 
constitutional separation-of-powers scholars, and that debate has produced a 
rare consensus across formal and functional approaches35 that purposive 
nonenforcement is problematic, if not illegal. 
 
31 For discussion of the Reagan-era programs, see JOEL A. MINTZ, ENFORCEMENT AT THE 
EPA: HIGH STAKES AND HARD CHOICES chs. 4-5 (2012) and William E. Kovacic, Reagan’s Judicial 
Appointees and Antitrust in the 1990s, 60 FORDHAM L. REV. 49, 66-67 (1991), which discuss the 
Administration’s adherence to a merger policy in which the government did not challenge 
conglomerate or vertical transactions. For discussion of the George W. Bush programs on 
deregulation, see generally Daniel T. Deacon, Note, Deregulation Through Nonenforcement, 85 N.Y.U. 
L. REV. 795 (2010), which examines deregulation through nonenforcement during the George W. 
Bush Administration and argues that the practice diminishes the government’s accountability, and 
Eric Biber, The Importance of Resource Allocation in Administrative Law, 60 ADMIN. L. REV. 1, 44 n.147 
(2008), which highlights the Bush Administration’s Clear Skies initiative as an example of a 
President instructing an agency not to enforce certain laws. 
32 See, e.g., Terry M. Moe & William G. Howell, Unilateral Action and Presidential Power: A 
Theory, 29 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 850, 854 (1999) (highlighting the growth and importance of 
presidential unilateral actions motivated by Presidents’ desires to have power and establish legacies 
as strong and effective leaders). 
33 See Love & Garg, supra note 9, at 1217 (suggesting that it is easier for a President to achieve 
a goal through nonenforcement, which does not require the help of Congress or the courts). 
34 See Cheh, supra note 18, at 253-55 (drawing thematic connections to Marbury v. Madison, 5 
U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803), where President Jefferson refused to perform the “ministerial” act of 
completing an appointment commanded by the legislature for more or less political reasons). 
35 See infra Sections I.A–B. For a discussion of the competing traditions of functionalism and 
formalism, see generally M. Elizabeth Magill, The Real Separation in Separation of Powers Law, 86 
VA. L. REV. 1127 (2000), which discusses the competing traditions and claims that the debate of 
formalism versus functionalism is a distraction. For a helpful breakdown of how some scholarship 
on the Take Care Clause and presidential nonenforcement discretion is more formalist and some is 
more functionalist, see Mitchell J. Widener, The Presentment Clause Meets the Suspension Power: The 
Affordable Care Act’s Long and Winding Road to Implementation, 24 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 109, 123-27 
(2015), which reviews various scholars’ solutions delineating the proper circumstances for when a 
President should exercise discretion, which often fall along formalist–functionalist lines. 
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A. Formalist Critiques 
The formalist argument against purposive presidential inaction stems 
from the plain text of the Take Care Clause as well as the history of its 
drafting and early interpretation. As Professors Delahunty and Yoo argue, the 
clause is “naturally read as an instruction or command to the President to put 
the laws into effect, or at least to see that they are put into effect, ‘without 
failure’ and ‘exactly.’”36 To be sure, the words “faithfully executed” do imply a 
modicum of discretion insofar as discretion is needed to further the “[c]lause’s 
core purpose of ensuring congressional supremacy.”37 But scholars now consider 
the clause to establish a presumption that Presidents will dutifully follow 
existing law, not make new law.38 This textual argument is strengthened by 
consideration of the history of the clause. While this Article is not the place for 
a detailed exegesis, it is now well understood that the Take Care Clause was 
crafted by the Framers to explicitly reject the pre–Glorious Revolution English 
tradition of executive suspending and dispensing of the law.39 
This textualist and historical interpretation counsels for very serious 
limitations on presidential nonenforcement discretion, but by itself it does 
not end the debate about the specific form of limitations. Thus, while 
Delahunty and Yoo argue for a flat rule that all “deliberate deviation[s]” from 
a baseline duty to enforce all laws are unconstitutional,40 others have been 
more measured in their response, acknowledging that the modern 
administrative state often necessitates nonenforcement of the law. For 
instance, Professor Price argues that the text and history of the clause require 
dual constitutional presumptions: first, a presumption that “executive officials 
lack inherent authority either to prospectively license statutory violations or 
to categorically suspend enforcement of statutes for policy reasons”; and 
second, a countervailing presumption that the exercise of particularized 
 
36 Delahunty & Yoo, supra note 4, at 799. 
37 Price, supra note 4, at 698. 
38 See id. at 688 (noting that the “take care duty implies a principle of legislative supremacy in 
lawmaking,” as “the President’s duty is to ensure execution of Congress’s laws, not to make up the 
law on his own”). 
39 See id. at 691 (“In the seventeenth century . . . as intense religious and political controversies 
during England’s civil wars unraveled traditions of deference to the monarch, royal suspensions and 
dispensations became a source of acute conflict between Parliament and the Crown.”); see also The 
Attorney Gen.’s Duty to Defend and Enforce Constitutionally Objectionable Legislation, 4A Op. 
O.L.C. 55, 57-58 (1980) (stating that the seventeenth century dispute between Parliament and the 
kings supports the proposition that the Framers did not mean to allow the Executive to disregard 
statutes); LOUIS FISHER, THE LAW OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH: PRESIDENTIAL POWER 9-11 
(Stephen M. Sheppard, ed., 2014) (discussing the Take Care Clause and the limits on presidential 
power); Delahunty & Yoo, supra note 4, at 808 (discussing the Framers’ knowledge of “England’s 
constitutional moment in 1689” and their understanding that “the Constitution’s grant of executive 
power did not include dispension”). 
40 Delahunty & Yoo, supra note 4, at 785. 
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discretion in individual cases is constitutional.41 Similarly, the White House 
Office of Legal Counsel (OLC), in its opinion on the legality of the 
Administration’s deferred action programs on immigration, offered its own 
principled interpretation of the boundaries of lawfulness. To the OLC, 
deferred action for parents of U.S. citizens and legal permanent residents was 
lawful because it was within the Department of Homeland Security’s expertise 
and was consistent with “congressional policy” to support “law-abiding parents 
of lawfully present children who have substantial ties to the community.”42 But 
for parents of child beneficiaries of the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals 
program, the OLC concluded that congressional policy in favor of “family 
unity” did not extend to “uniting persons who lack lawful status (or prospective 
lawful status) in the United States with their families.”43 
The OLC’s approach amounts to a purposivist or intentionalist standard 
under which separation-of-powers problems are potentially presented when the 
President’s nonenforcement undermines the relevant statute’s purpose, as when 
President Obama’s deferred action program allegedly departed from the policy 
behind the nation’s immigration statutes (i.e., preventing the separation of 
people legally entitled to be in the United States from their families abroad). 
The OLC’s approach appears to track Professors Manning and Goldsmith’s 
concept of the “completion power,” which involves an implied, or inherent, 
power in the office of the President to carry into execution “unfinished 
statutory scheme[s],” but “does not permit the President to act contra legem.”44 
B. Functionalist Critiques 
Scholars have also approached the problem from a functionalist 
perspective and drawn similar conclusions that the practice should be 
curtailed or policed (though their prescriptions often differ substantially). 
Many scholars accept the premise offered by Professors Posner and Vermeule 
that we live in an era that demands some departure from the liberal legalist 
fiction of a constrained executive agent doing the bidding of the lawmaking 
 
41 Price, supra note 4, at 704. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit recently seemed 
to adopt something close to this principle, though not on the constitutional level, finding that the 
Obama Administration’s deferred action program on immigration was reviewable under the APA 
where it amounted to “the affirmative act of conferring ‘lawful presence’ on a class of unlawfully 
present aliens.” Texas v. United States, 787 F.3d 733, 757 (5th Cir. 2015). 
42 The Dep’t of Homeland Sec.’s Authority to Prioritize Removal of Certain Aliens Unlawfully 
Present in the U.S. and to Defer Removal of Others, 38 Op. O.L.C., at 31 (Nov. 19, 2014), 
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/olc/opinions/attachments/2014/11/20/2014-11-19-auth-
prioritize-removal.pdf [https://perma.cc/XC9G-6HR2] [hereinafter DACA Authority]. 
43 Id. at 32. 
44 Jack Goldsmith & John F. Manning, The President’s Completion Power, 115 YALE L.J. 2280, 
2302, 2309 (2006); see also FISHER, supra note 39, at 68-73 (drawing distinctions between implied 
and inherent powers). 
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legislature,45 but nevertheless maintain that nonenforcement discretion 
upsets a pragmatic or functional balance in our modern separation-of-powers 
system. For instance, Jeffrey Love and Arpit Garg contend that “interbranch 
competition” is structurally undermined by the ease with which a President 
seeking to underenforce the law can implement his policy preferences, 
compared with a President that must positively enact new statutory authority 
to take action beyond what is authorized in the legal status quo.46 Recognizing 
that if Presidents “could ignore the mandate to enforce, [they] would be able 
to nullify statutes, an outcome wholly inconsistent with the separation of 
powers and the Take Care Clause,” Professor Andrias nevertheless insists that 
some departure from this formality is practically necessary, because of both 
“longstanding conceptions of presidential power and the practical reality of 
executive power.”47 As she notes, “[P]residential involvement in the enforcement 
of statutes involves a considerable degree of law-shaping, if not lawmaking: 
Political value judgments are inevitable given conflicting enforcement missions, 
broad delegations, and scarce resources.”48 For Andrias, the challenge then 
becomes finding ways to balance these competing pulls—something that she 
asserts can be accomplished by building up the coordinating institutions 
surrounding presidential enforcement control, thereby contributing to the 
public visibility of decisions to enforce and not enforce and promoting political 
process controls on this executive discretion.49 
II. THE PROBLEM WITH JUDICIAL OVERSIGHT OF 
NONENFORCEMENT DISCRETION 
The varied approaches and perspectives briefly catalogued mask two 
points of considerable consensus. First, most scholars engaged in the 
contemporary debate over presidential nonenforcement discretion are 
sensitive to the legal and practical problems associated with the practice. To 
be sure, there could be other silent observers that see the practice as benign 
or even laudable, but there is indeed some degree of consensus among the 
vocal that something must be done to curtail the ability of Presidents to use 
this tactic.50 Perhaps it should come as no surprise, then, that litigants have 
 
45 POSNER & VERMEULE, supra note 21, at 113-14. 
46 See Love & Garg, supra note 9, at 1206 (arguing that checks and balances should limit 
presidential policymaking through inaction). 
47 Andrias, supra note 8, at 1114. Future Presidents could, of course, reverse course and begin 
enforcing the law, and indeed there may be opportunities for third-party enforcement or civil liability, 
all of which should temper any sense that statutes can be “nullified” by unilateral presidential action. 
48 Id. at 1114-15. 
49 See id. at 1115 (“Institutionalizing presidential enforcement would . . . make it easier for 
Congress, the bureaucracy, and the public to evaluate and respond to presidential action.”). 
50 See supra Sections I.A–B (discussing the breadth of criticism of presidential nonenforcement). 
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begun to test the constitutional waters.51 But that litigation also points to the 
second item of considerable consensus among scholars: that whatever 
limitations exist on the practice of presidential nonenforcement discretion, 
they are, and ought to be, “nonjudicial” in nature. That is, even for those who 
are willing to articulate rules or standards for constitutional adjudication of a 
Take Care Clause claim, those rules or standards are aspirational rather than 
actionable. Delahunty, Yoo, and Price remain fairly quiet about the specific 
mechanics of judicial review in their respective articles.52 Others engage the 
question to some extent but ultimately dismiss a role for courts in vindicating 
the Take Care Clause. Andrias assumes that courts could not play a major role 
in policing presidential discretion because courts following Heckler v. Chaney 
“typically stay out of controversies surrounding executive programmatic 
decisions, including nonenforcement decisions.”53 It is this second item of 
consensus—i.e., that courts do not, and will likely not, assume a role in 
policing presidential inaction—that this Article challenges. 
Why is it that scholars who all see presidential nonenforcement as 
problematic and worthy of attention are nevertheless unwilling to assign a 
meaningful constitutional role to the branch of government most traditionally 
associated with resolving separation-of-powers disputes? This question is 
especially pressing when scholars are willing to articulate constitutional limits; 
after all, what could possibly justify courts in refraining from enforcing 
constitutional norms that are at issue in cases properly before them? Although 
the literature remains relatively silent on the reasons why the courts cannot play 
a role in policing presidential inaction, I suggest that there are two major reasons. 
First, some of the hesitancy to assign a role to the courts results from an 
implicit understanding of the limits of judicial capacity. Courts have finite 
capacity to hear and decide cases, and they are therefore likely to craft legal 
doctrine in ways that protect them against excessive litigation. These incentives 
to craft legal doctrine with an eye to the workload it creates are particularly 
acute in areas of the law that Professor Andrew Coan calls “hybrid” domains, 
 
51 See, e.g., Texas v. United States, 86 F. Supp. 3d 591, 677 (S.D. Tex.) (discussing, but ultimately 
deferring judgment on, the plaintiffs’ Take Care Clause claim), aff ’d, 809 F.3d 134 (5th Cir. 2015), aff ’d 
by an equally divided court, United States v. Texas, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016) (mem.) (per curiam). 
52 Delahunty & Yoo, supra note 4; Price, supra note 4. 
53 See Andrias, supra note 8, at 1119. Heckler’s presumption is so sacrosanct to Professor Andrias 
that she goes to great lengths to assure readers that her proposals to increase the transparency and 
publicity of presidential nonenforcement decisions will not result in greater levels of judicial review. 
See id. at 1119-23. Love and Garg are even less sanguine about any potential role for courts. They do 
not even acknowledge the possibility of a judicially implementable constitutional rule or standard. 
See Love & Garg, supra note 9, at 1249-50 (offering instead a canon of statutory interpretation that 
would indirectly reinforce constitutional norms in statutory cases). Further, they outright dismiss 
the APA approach, claiming that Heckler v. Chaney and its progeny effectively “narrowed the scope 
of APA review to the point that judicial review of agency inaction is virtually nonexistent.” Id. at 1226. 
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which are combinations of “high-volume” and “high-stakes” domains.54 These 
are legal domains that concern problems that arise so frequently and that have 
such importance to the government that the appellate courts (and particularly 
the Supreme Court) feel compelled to review almost every claim. In such 
domains, once a court becomes involved, its only workable doctrinal choice is 
to adopt hard-edged rules that deter litigation and facilitate easy resolution. 
Policy-oriented presidential inaction is clearly a hybrid domain.55 There are 
literally hundreds, if not thousands, of nonenforcement decisions of one kind or 
another made by executive officials and line agents every single day.56 If each of 
these nonenforcement decisions is potentially a constitutional violation, then the 
number of potential cases that could be brought in federal court is staggering. 
One escape from this precarious situation is simply to take the issue out of the 
courts’ hands in favor of process-based remedies, as some scholars have urged.57 
Indeed, preserving a role for the courts in the face of this institutional reality 
immediately creates problems. Professors Delahunty and Yoo ultimately argue 
that almost every departure from perfect enforcement is a constitutional 
violation,58 and it is not difficult to see why they might want to adopt this extreme 
stance. Such a hard-edged rule ensures that, were courts to attempt to implement 
it, they would not have to make difficult, resource-exhausting judgments on a 
case-by-case basis. Yet, just as assuredly, it means that the courts will never adopt 
it: such a blunt rule is hopelessly over- and under-inclusive in dealing with a 
public administration and legal problem that oozes complexity. 
Professor Price’s dueling presumptions run into slightly different 
problems—those related to judicial capacity.59 They resemble a standard, and 
as such, they face the problem of judicial capacity head on. Courts would have 
 
54 Andrew B. Coan, Judicial Capacity and the Substance of Constitutional Law, 122 YALE L.J. 422, 
440-42 (2012). 
55 Indeed, nonenforcement discretion fits a pattern when it comes to judicial constraints on 
executive power, for as Coan and Nicholas Bullard suggest, the stakes are high enough in this area 
that many categories of potential claims are hybrid, or at least high-volume, domains. Andrew Coan 
& Nicholas Bullard, Judicial Capacity and Executive Power, 102 VA. L. REV. 765, 775-76 (2016). 
56 See generally EUGENE BARDACH & ROBERT A. KAGAN, GOING BY THE BOOK: THE 
PROBLEM OF REGULATORY UNREASONABLENESS (2002) (discussing the different styles of 
enforcement in regulatory law and the opportunity to exercise substantial discretion in day-to-day 
work). For instance, the OLC estimated that there are “approximately 11.3 million undocumented 
aliens in the country” but only enough resources to “remove fewer than 400,000 such aliens each 
year.” DACA Authority, supra note 42, at 1. 
57 See Andrias, supra note 8, at 1121-22 (proposing an institutionalization process to channel 
presidential power); Love & Garg, supra note 9, at 1232 (outlining the processes that can provide 
oversight and contain executive discretion). 
58 See Delahunty & Yoo, supra note 4, at 784-85 (arguing that there is no general presidential 
nonenforcement power and any deviation from the Take Care Clause is “presumptively forbidden”). 
59 See supra note 41 and accompanying text. The rebuttable presumptions are, again, that ad 
hoc nonenforcement decisions are presumptively constitutional even where they are policy-based, but 
prospective nonenforcement decisions are presumptively unconstitutional. Price, supra note 4, at 704. 
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to entertain many defenses to the tune that even though a particular 
nonenforcement decision fell into the presumptively unconstitutional 
prospective variety, the presumption was rebuttable in that case for whatever 
reason, and vice versa for claims regarding nonenforcement actions that were 
presumptively constitutional. This would not be a problem if there were other 
features of the doctrine that could effectively insulate courts as they went 
about applying this standard; as it is, however, those insulating features do 
not exist,60 and courts applying Price’s presumptions would be defenseless 
against an onslaught of cases that would exhaust the entire capacity of the 
judiciary. The result likely would be that courts would quickly abandon any 
pretense of reviewing nonenforcement cases of all kinds, as only a rule of 
deference could provide the certainty that could avert a caseload tsunami.61 
Again, this probably explains why Price fails to consider in any depth the 
probable mechanics of judicial implementation of his proposal. 
That is not to say that Price is wrong to articulate the fuzzy constitutional 
line he does. In fact, his intuition that presidential responsibility to “take Care 
that the Laws be faithfully executed” constrains Presidents primarily when 
they make prospective policy decisions about whole swaths of cases and less 
when they make particularized decisions for resource or equity reasons seems 
far more reasonable than Delahunty and Yoo’s more extreme position that all 
deviations from perfect enforcement are unconstitutional. Price’s attempt to 
remind more rigid formalists of the virtues and inevitability of 
nonenforcement in the modern administrative state is admirable. But Price’s 
choice to capture this complexity with a standard means that his 
constitutional test could never, as a practical matter, be implemented with any 
rigor by the federal courts—something he basically acknowledges by citing 
no modern cases in favor of the standard he articulates.62 There simply would 
be too many cases that would require nuanced applications of the standard. 
Second, we might be skeptical of courts’ ability to keep pace with 
executive decisionmaking under any circumstances. Whatever constitutional 
rule or standard courts would apply would ultimately require them to tread 
on very sensitive ground with very little sense of the lay of the land. As Posner 
and Vermeule argue, courts are at an inherent disadvantage compared to the 
executive because they are backward-looking.63 Courts usually hear cases long 
 
60 As discussed below, they would potentially exist to the extent that the claims were attached to 
an APA claim, but not if they were brought as a freestanding constitutional claim. See infra Section III.B. 
61 See Coan, supra note 54, at 446 (arguing that in “high-stakes, high-volume, and hybrid 
domains,” one tool the court could use to limit litigation is a categorical rule of deference). 
62 See Price, supra note 4, at 747 (noting that “[f]or their part, courts have characterized the 
task of deciding whether or not to prosecute as a fundamentally executive function”). 
63 See POSNER & VERMEULE, supra note 21, at 52 (“A basic feature of judicial review . . . is that courts 
rely upon the initiative of private parties to bring suits . . . . This means that there is always a time lag . . . .”). 
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after the purported inaction occurred, at which point it is very difficult for 
them to second-guess what the executive branch has done.64 These difficulties 
would apply to the substantive policy judgments that the executive branch made, 
as well as to threshold legal questions such as whether the nonenforcement was 
really a prospective policy decision applying to a class of cases or just ad hoc 
nonenforcement. Moreover, if a case is decided at the constitutional level, the 
intrusiveness and binding nature of that decision would provide further reasons 
for deference, as courts would not want to prospectively constrain executive 
officials. Given these difficulties, courts would likely be extremely deferential 
even if they were to find a doctrinal form that solved their other problems. 
Perhaps these practical considerations constraining courts in exercising 
constitutional oversight of nonenforcement discretion do not really amount 
to a “problem.” After all, as leading theorists now understand, just because 
the President is not constrained by the forms of legal liberalism does not 
mean that he is a rogue actor. He still must compete for popular support and 
will generally appeal to the median voter.65 Indeed, the President’s role as the 
only nationally elected government official makes him the best possible 
official to organize and implement a coherent policy agenda that reflects 
larger democratic sentiment.66 But to accept that a powerful President is an 
inevitable and desirable part of our modern public law framework is not to 
say that the other branches should willingly abdicate checking the President 
where they can. If there is a way for courts to discipline presidential 
nonenforcement discretion without overwhelming their capacity, courts and 
scholars should embrace that method. 
III. THE SOLUTION: JUDICIAL APPLICATION OF THE APA 
There is a better way for courts to vindicate the values underlying the 
Take Care Clause without entering a separation-of-powers war of attrition 
that they are likely to lose, and that way is already operating right under our 
noses. In short, courts already engage in far more effective review of 
purposive executive inaction under the administrative law of agency inaction 
than they ever could under a free-floating constitutional rule or standard. 
In this Part, I take a close look at the structure of the administrative law of 
agency inaction under the APA. While Presidents are not technically constrained 
 
64 Id. 
65 See id. at 115 (noting that “[p]residents strive to maintain the popularity” and arguing that 
this results in constraints on the Executive beyond the separation of powers). 
66 See Kagan, supra note 26, at 2331-39 (discussing the President’s ability to consider the general 
public in light of his democratic election). 
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by the APA,67 virtually every presidential initiative, policy, or decision eventually 
manifests itself in agency action that is constrained by the APA.68 It is at that 
point that courts can play an important functional role in “translat[ing]” 
separation-of-powers principles and values into meaningful constraints.69 Like 
Price’s dueling presumptions—but to an even greater degree—the 
arbitrariness review courts conduct under the APA supplies an attractive 
standard that provides courts with the flexibility they need to make inherently 
difficult judgments about why some inaction is problematic and some is not. 
Unlike Price’s approach, and, indeed, unlike any freestanding constitutional 
separation-of-powers claim, this contextualized arbitrariness standard is 
protected from the judicial capacity problem by several layers of defenses. 
APA review operates with greater functionality because the complexity, 
uncertainty, and limited precedential value of review limit the incentives to 
flood the courts with cases and make presidential reprisal less likely, thus 
giving the courts more powers when they do intervene. This functionality 
point is critical and is elaborated in much greater detail in subsection III.B.2. 
All together, these three features give nuance and power to courts as they 
selectively police purposive presidential inaction. 
A. The Structure of APA Inaction Review and the Limited Domain of  
Heckler v. Chaney 
Before developing the argument for employing APA review, I must first 
address caricatures of APA review of agency inaction that suggest that Heckler 
v. Chaney bars most suits based on agency inaction. As mentioned before, 
several participants in the debate about presidential nonenforcement cite to 
Heckler v. Chaney in dismissing a role for courts.70 
The APA provides for review of agency action “unlawfully withheld or 
unreasonably delayed,”71 and it likewise defines agency action to include a 
 
67 See Dalton v. Specter, 511 U.S. 462, 476 (1994) (holding that the President is not an agency 
and thus is not constrained by the APA). 
68 See infra Section III.B; see also Kagan, supra note 26, at 2350-51 (distinguishing Franklin v. 
Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788 (1992), on the grounds that the statute in that instance specifically 
committed the responsibility to the sole discretion of the President rather than to an agency). Of 
course, I do not mean to suggest that the President’s policy goals will always be the same as his 
agents’ goals; there will undoubtedly be “slack between the President’s wishes and the behavior of 
his or her many agents because no front-end guidance can anticipate the precise details and 
circumstances of every possible violation of the law.” Rachel E. Barkow, Clemency and Presidential 
Administration of Criminal Law, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 802, 806 (2015). 
69 See POSNER & VERMEULE, supra note 21, at 84 (citing Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity in 
Translation, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1165 (1993)). 
70 See supra note 53 and accompanying text. 
71 5 U.S.C. § 706(1) (2012). 
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“failure to act.”72 This general equivalence of action and inaction73 is, however, 
limited by two provisions in the APA: section 701(a)(1) precludes judicial 
review where Congress specifically precludes judicial review,74 and section 
701(a)(2) precludes judicial review where agency action (or agency inaction) 
is “committed to agency discretion by law.”75 As many scholars and jurists have 
noted, it is somewhat inconsistent that the APA precludes review of decisions 
“committed to agency discretion by law” but then specifically provides for judicial 
review of agency actions for “abuse of discretion.”76 Perhaps because of this 
inconsistency, judges have developed an elaborate common law of 
presumptions77—first a presumption of reviewability that can be overridden only 
by clear congressional language precluding review,78 and then a countervailing 
presumption of unreviewability in certain distinct classes of cases.79 
Some accounts lump the entirety of agency inaction cases into this final 
doctrinal bin,80 and indeed it is not inaccurate to say that it is more difficult to 
challenge inaction under the APA than it is to challenge action, partly because of 
the specter of Heckler v. Chaney and partly because courts sometimes avoid 
interference with agency priority-setting and resource allocation.81 But the 
literature on purposive presidential inaction prematurely considers inaction 
review a dead letter.82 The reality is more complex. 
 
72 Id. § 551(13). 
73 See Eric Biber, Two Sides of the Same Coin: Judicial Review of Administrative Agency Action and 
Inaction, 26 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 461, 461 (2008) (noting that there is “confusion about the proper 
standard of review and the distinction between agency action and inaction”). 
74 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(1) (2012). 
75 Id. § 701(a)(2). 
76 Id. § 706(2)(A). 
77 See Andrias, supra note 8, at 1050 (discussing the “presumption of reviewability that governs agency 
action”). For an excellent recent treatment of this case law and a critique of the presumption of reviewability, 
see generally Nicholas Bagley, The Puzzling Presumption of Reviewability, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1285 (2014). 
78 Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 140-41 (1967). 
79 Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 837-38 (1985). 
80 See Glen Staszewski, The Federal Inaction Commission, 59 EMORY L.J. 369, 381-82 (2009) 
(arguing that courts rarely act on agency inaction). 
81 See Biber, supra note 31, at 16 (discussing “an explicit concern about interfering with how the 
Executive Branch allocates its resources among various priorities”); see also Star Wireless, LLC v. FCC, 
522 F.3d 469, 475 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (noting the strong presumption in inaction cases that an “agency need 
not address all problems at once” and “may solve first those problems it prioritizes”). Love and Garg also 
argue that, were courts to attempt to scale up their role, they would inevitably confront “prudential 
concerns” that would “likely prevent review.” Love & Garg, supra note 9, at 1226. These prudential concerns 
include the fact that it is “difficult to define a ‘case’ of inaction that is suitable for review,” that “courts face 
a series of line-drawing questions that make them particularly deferential to the executive on the merits,” 
and that “judges are likely wary of granting a remedy that amounts to telling the executive how and when 
to act.” Id. at 1227-28. As will become clear, I largely agree that these are difficult problems to surmount, 
as much in the APA context as in a hypothetical constitutional context. In subsection III.B.2, I nevertheless 
argue that the institution of review under the APA has adapted to allow courts to sidestep these problems 
in a way that they are not able to in any hypothetical constitutional context. 
82 See supra Sections I.A–B. 
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1. Avoiding Heckler 
Technically, Heckler covered only one particular species of inaction 
claim—nonenforcement claims. In Heckler, a prisoner on death row had filed 
a petition with the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) requesting that 
the agency investigate whether the drugs used in lethal injection were “safe and 
effective,” order manufacturers to include warnings against the off-label uses of 
these drugs, and take a number of enforcement actions to deter off-label use.83 
The Supreme Court emphasized the unique challenge for courts in monitoring 
decisions of whether to enforce the law in particular cases.84 
But these kinds of considerations do not weigh as heavily in other types 
of inaction claims, including informal agency spending decisions, denials of 
petitions for rulemaking or enforcement, incomplete rulemakings, agency 
refusals to adjudicate in the face of congressional command, and refusals to 
issue rules in response to congressional command.85 When it comes to cases 
alleging inaction in the issuance of rules, for instance, courts arguably would 
have an easier time conducting review, as the determination would then hinge 
more on compliance with a statute rather than on fact-based considerations 
about resource allocation.86 In fact, courts have been more willing to find 
agency inaction reviewable for arbitrariness when plaintiffs are able to frame 
the inaction not as ad hoc, discretionary nonenforcement, but as falling into 
one of these other categories instead.87 Courts have routinely exercised review 
over inaction claims outside the context of discretionary enforcement 
inaction.88 To be sure, where courts review a failure to promulgate a rule or 
adjudicate a class of cases, they typically apply a “highly deferential” species 
of arbitrariness review.89 It is review nonetheless, and agencies must still 
provide reasons sounding in the statute in order to support their choice.90 
 
83 See RICHARD J. PIERCE, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 1606 (5th ed. 2010). 
84 Id. at 1607. 
85 See Biber, supra note 31, at 28-32 (reviewing the different types of agency actions and the 
level of deference afforded). 
86 See id. at 49-50 (explaining that “statutory supremacy concerns would trump concerns about 
resource allocation” in judicial review for agency inaction). 
87 See id. at 51 (showing that agency actions governed by “detailed statutory requirements” or 
a “clear duty” receive lower levels of deference than informal decisions). 
88 See, e.g., Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 534-35 (2007) (holding that the EPA acted arbitrarily 
in refusing to act on a rulemaking petition to regulate greenhouse gases); Brown v. Sec’y of Health & 
Human Servs., 46 F.3d 102, 110 (1st Cir. 1995) (indicating that the refusal to amend an agency rule is 
reviewable under the arbitrary and capricious standard); Am. Horse Prot. Ass’n v. Lyng, 812 F.2d 1, 4-5 
(D.C. Cir. 1987) (reviewing the Department of Agriculture’s refusal to initiate rulemaking procedures). 
89 See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 528 (quoting Nat’l Customs Brokers & Forwarders 
Ass’n of Am., Inc. v. United States, 883 F.2d 93, 96 (D.C. Cir. 1989)). 
90 See id. at 532 (“The alternative basis for EPA’s decision—that even if it does have statutory 
authority to regulate greenhouse gases, it would be unwise to do so at this time—rests on reasoning 
divorced from the statutory text.”). 
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Plaintiffs can therefore greatly increase their chances of review by 
characterizing prospective nonenforcement decisions as affirmative rules or 
policies, which is often quite easy to do.91 At some point, patterns of 
nonenforcement start to resemble rules, particularly when a memorandum, 
guidance document, or policy statement guides the exercise of nonenforcement 
discretion and qualifies as final agency action.92 Therefore, courts can avoid 
Heckler’s domain and subject the decision to arbitrariness review, as well as 
any other kind of review generally available under the APA, including 
procedural review. 
In sum, Heckler is a limited precedent. As Professor Biber showed in the 
most exhaustive effort to date on review of agency inaction, Heckler v. Chaney 
is not “the basis for an exception to judicial review that might swallow all of 
judicial review of agency decisions not to act. Instead, it is simply the result 
of the principled application of judicial deference to resource allocation in a 
relatively limited subset of cases of agency decisionmaking”93—i.e., 
particularized enforcement decisions in a context of statutory silence. 
2. Overcoming Heckler 
Even when it comes to cases that clearly fall into the “discretionary 
nonenforcement decision” category, review is not entirely unavailable. Heckler 
did not announce a hard-line rule, but in fact outlined several situations where 
the presumption of unreviewability can be rebutted. First, as mentioned 
before, if a mandate in a statute is couched in nondiscretionary terms, and is 
paired with “law to apply”94 that can guide the courts in review, courts will 
still be able to review nonenforcement decisions.95 Thus, “when push comes 
to shove and there is a direct conflict between statutory language (such as a 
deadline) and an agency claim that its resource allocation priorities are 
different, courts have consistently chosen clear statutory language over the 
 
91 See, e.g., Texas v. United States, 787 F.3d 733, 758 (5th Cir. 2015) (holding that under DAPA, 
an individual is affirmatively given a “change in designation that confers eligibility for federal and 
state benefits on a class of aliens who would not otherwise qualify,” thus “provid[ing] a focus for 
judicial review, inasmuch as the agency must have exercised its power in some manner” (internal 
quotation marks omitted) (quoting Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 832 (1985))). 
92 See Cook v. FDA, 733 F.3d 1, 7 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (acknowledging a real dispute about whether 
the FDA had made “affirmative acts of approval rather than refusals to take enforcement action,” 
but deciding the case on other grounds); see also Texas v. United States, 787 F.3d at 757-58 (holding 
that a memorandum on immigration was an affirmative action rather than agency inaction). 
93 Biber, supra note 31, at 38; see also Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, The Law of “Not 
Now”: When Agencies Defer Decisions, 103 GEO. L.J. 157, 160-61 (2014) (emphasizing the primacy of 
resource allocation concerns in setting the stringency of review of agency inaction under the APA). 
94 See Citizens to Pres. Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 412-13 (1971) (holding that 
the existence of a statute necessarily implies a “law to apply” and therefore limits agency discretion). 
95 See PIERCE, supra note 83, at 1607. 
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agency claims of resource allocation discretion.”96 For example, in Dunlop v. 
Bachowski, the Supreme Court sanctioned review of the Department of Labor’s 
refusal to bring a civil action against a union under the Labor–Management 
Reporting and Disclosure Act.97 The Heckler Court cited Bachowski for the 
proposition that courts could, and should, review even nonenforcement cases 
when it is clear that Congress intended to constrain agency discretion by 
using language such as “shall” or “must.”98 
More importantly, Heckler v. Chaney also created an agency nonenforcement 
discretion limitation that scholars have now begun to call an “anti-abdication 
principle.”99 According to the Court in Heckler, the facts of that case simply did 
not involve a situation where the agency “‘consciously and expressly adopted a 
general policy’ that is so extreme as to amount to an abdication of its statutory 
responsibilities.”100 In cases where the agency has completely disregarded a 
statutory program through the announcement of enforcement guidelines101 or 
 
96 Biber, supra note 31, at 38; see also id. at 17 (“A cursory examination of lower court case law 
under § 706(1) makes clear that the analysis of whether an agency must act under § 706(1) often 
turns on whether the courts have concluded that the case involves important resource allocation 
issues.”); Sunstein & Vermeule, supra note 93, at 162 (discussing the same basic trend in the case law 
and dubbing it the “anti-circumvention principle”). 
97 See Dunlop v. Bachowski, 421 U.S. 560, 567 (1975) (“In the absence of an express prohibition 
in the [statute], the Secretary, therefore, bears the heavy burden of overcoming the strong 
presumption that Congress did not mean to prohibit all judicial review of his decision.”). 
98 See Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 833-34 (1985) (discussing how in Dunlop, the statutory 
language, including the use of “shall,” removed prosecutorial discretion). For applications of this 
principle, see, for example, Mach Mining, LLC v. EEOC, 135 S. Ct. 1645, 1651 (2015), which reasons 
that language in statutes that is “mandatory, not precatory” increases the reviewability of 
enforcement of that regime. See also Friends of the Cowlitz v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 253 
F.3d 1161, 1167 (9th Cir. 2001) (noting that a “decision not to enforce may be reviewable if Congress 
has provided clear legislative direction limiting an agency’s enforcement discretion, and the agency 
nonetheless engages in a pattern of nonenforcement”), amended by 282 F.3d 609 (9th Cir. 2002); 
Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. U.S. EPA, 980 F.2d 765, 773-74 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (holding that Heckler’s 
presumption of unreviewability was rebutted where there was “law to apply” that established 
Congress’s intent to “circumscribe agency enforcement discretion”); Sierra Club v. Hodel, 848 F.2d 
1068, 1075 (10th Cir. 1988) (holding that the Department of the Interior’s (DOI) decision to allow 
construction of a road in a wilderness area—despite statutory language providing that the 
Department “manage [Wilderness Study Areas] ‘in a manner so as not to impair the suitability of 
such areas for preservation as wilderness’” and requiring the DOI to designate roadless areas in such 
wilderness areas—was reviewable because the statute was couched as a command and provided 
judicially manageable standards to permit review (quoting 43 U.S.C. § 1782(c) (2012))), overruled on 
other grounds by Village of Los Ranchos De Albuquerque v. Marsh, 956 F.2d 970 (10th Cir. 1992). 
99 See Sunstein & Vermeule, supra note 93, at 162-63 (referring to the idea that “agencies may 
not invoke their ability to allocate limited resources in such a way as to abdicate their statutory 
responsibilities” as the “anti-abdication principle”). 
100 470 U.S. at 833 n.4 (quoting Adams v. Richardson, 480 F.2d 1159, 1162 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (en banc)). 
101 See Riverkeeper, Inc. v. Collins, 359 F.3d 156, 169 (2d Cir. 2004) (holding that the NRC’s 
final decision was not reviewable even though it had failed to take action on a “discrete, perceived 
problem within its area of statutory responsibility”); Crowley Caribbean Transp., Inc. v. Pena, 37 
F.3d 671, 677 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (declining to review an agency’s “context-bound non-enforcement 
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through a pattern or practice of nonenforcement,102 review will potentially be 
available despite the potential interference with agency resource allocation. 
To be sure, judicial application of the “anti-abdication principle” is usually 
used only in extreme cases, precisely because of these problems of judicial 
administration.103 But the principle is a limit on Heckler’s domain nonetheless. 
The point of reviewing these exceptions and the limits of Heckler in 
subsection III.A.1 is to underscore that dismissive treatments of APA inaction 
review overstate Heckler’s domain and unjustifiably throw up the white flag 
with respect to judicial constraints on purposive presidential inaction. Heckler 
is not some talismanic citation that forever forecloses review of inaction of 
any kind.104 As this discussion shows, courts find ways to review agency 
inaction, and those ways may provide an avenue for courts to translate 
constitutional values through the APA. The much more important question 
is whether courts’ involvement in this posture is likely to be effective and, 
more precisely, whether such involvement would address the problems that 
doom constitutional review. 
B. The Functionality of APA Inaction Review 
Having cleared a major doctrinal hurdle, and having seen that review is at 
times available (and precisely when the unilateral deviation from intended 
enforcement is most extreme and most prospective), we can begin to see that 
APA review of agency inaction has several features that make it useful in checking 
excessive or unwarranted instances of purposive presidential inaction. Some of 
these features are inherent in the administrative process—overall, administrative 
litigation promotes certain values, such as transparency and dialogue, which tend 
to raise the costs of purposive presidential inaction. That is to say, such litigation 
is one way to promote the very values that Andrias, Love, Garg, and others hope 
 
pronouncement” but noting that review would be available where a “document announcing a 
particular non-enforcement decision would actually lay out a general policy delineating the boundary 
between enforcement and non-enforcement and purport to speak to a broad class of parties”). 
102 See Riverkeeper, 359 F.3d at 170-71 (finding that the court did not have jurisdiction to review 
the Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s decision not to enforce certain Atomic Energy Act provisions); 
NAACP v. Sec’y of Hous. & Urban Dev., 817 F.2d 149, 157-58 (1st Cir. 1987) (granting review where 
plaintiffs claimed that HUD’s pattern of not administering programs failed to further the goals of the 
Fair Housing Act); Adams v. Richardson, 480 F.2d 1159, 1161-63 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (en banc) (finding 
review appropriate when the agency failed to take sufficient action to end segregation in public schools). 
103 See Sunstein & Vermeule, supra note 93, at 162 (“Because of the difficulties in administering 
the principle, it will usually amount to a judicially underenforced constraint, but it remains an 
important backstop that judges may invoke in extreme cases.”). 
104 See Ronald M. Levin, Understanding Unreviewability in Administrative Law, 74 MINN. L. 
REV. 689, 740-57 (1990) (discussing how courts have in fact developed a common law of 
unreviewability that belies any simple characterization of review as generally available or unavailable). 
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to instill in the process through other means. Other features are only apparent 
when put in contrast with constitutional review. 
1. Inherent Virtues 
When a President’s decision not to enforce the law leads an administrative 
agency to make a concrete decision not to enforce the law in a particular case 
or class of cases, the possibility of judicial review under the APA forces the 
agency to explain its reasoning. This reason-giving norm is so embedded in 
agency culture that the threat of litigation hardly has to be realistic to have 
some effect. Agencies are likely to volunteer reasons for their actions. By 
itself, this reason-giving culture can enhance the legitimacy of policymaking 
by encouraging deliberation that may not naturally occur in cases of 
presidential inaction,105 which is generally less visible to the public.106 
Agencies can also in effect tie themselves to the mast: indeed, they can bind 
themselves to reviewability by issuing rules or engaging in a “settled course 
of adjudication” that essentially promises certain levels of nonenforcement in 
certain domains of conduct.107 Any reason that agencies (and in turn, the 
President) offer for nonenforcement would have to address any prior 
commitments or previous policies. This constraint may help address the 
asymmetry between the institutional checks on a proregulatory President 
versus the checks on a deregulatory President. In effect, a President who 
comes to office hoping to deregulate would face more difficulty to the extent 
agencies bind themselves with rules or guidance documents that effectively 
promise certain levels or kinds of enforcement. This built-up structure of 
discretion-reducing rules works only to the extent that courts are willing to 
hold agencies to their own rules and policies, and, in fact, courts do step in 
frequently in these kinds of cases.108 
Moreover, it is critical to note that agencies are capable of sending signals 
through their reason-giving in ways that expose purely political maneuvers 
 
105 See Mark Seidenfeld, The Role of Politics in a Deliberative Model of the Administrative State, 81 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 1397, 1426 (2013) (“The deliberative promise of the administrative state stems from the 
fact that agency decisionmaking can be inclusive, knowledgeable, reasoned, and transformative.”). 
106 See Andrias, supra note 8, at 1093 (discussing the lack of transparency in presidential enforcement). 
107 See, e.g., INS v. Yang, 519 U.S. 26, 32 (1996) (“Though the agency’s discretion is unfettered 
at the outset, if it announces and follows—by rule or by settled course of adjudication—a general 
policy by which its exercise of discretion will be governed, an irrational departure from that policy 
(as opposed to an avowed alteration of it) could constitute action that must be overturned as 
‘arbitrary, capricious, [or] an abuse of discretion’ within the meaning of the Administrative 
Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A).” (alteration in original)). 
108 See, e.g., Smriko v. Ashcroft, 387 F.3d 279, 291, 297 (3d Cir. 2004) (reviewing and vacating 
action by the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) where a single BIA member “clearly failed to 
follow . . . regulations”). 
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by a President.109 Because courts may tolerate thin reasoning but will balk at 
purely political reasoning under existing administrative law doctrine,110 an 
agency that feels it is being strong-armed to abandon its mission can itself 
sound the alarm for courts by embedding record evidence that political 
considerations were determinative or by failing to build an adequate record 
to support the (in)action under arbitrariness review. In effect, agencies’ 
ability to signal to courts the cases most worthy of consideration for inaction 
review makes agencies an important intermediary actor and a check on 
purposive presidential inaction. The administration may be able to dictate 
nonenforcement from on high, but its imperfect ability to control agencies in 
their reason-giving activities, caused by all the standard principal–agent 
challenges, will make it more difficult for a President to push through the 
most extreme abdications of statutory programs. Of course, these functional 
checks embedded in the administrative process work only if courts feel free 
to review inaction claims—but as we have seen, they will often avoid or 
overcome Heckler.111 
Another indirect inherent virtue of the possibility of judicial review under 
the APA is that it creates incentives for Congress to assume responsibility for 
specifying the level of enforcement it desires. Under existing case law, it is 
clear that mandatory language in statutes will ordinarily carry the day in court 
even when resource allocation concerns are an issue.112 Although Congress 
may not be entirely aware of how clear this line of cases is,113 and even though 
 
109 See generally Daniel E. Walters, Litigation-Fostered Bureaucratic Autonomy: Administrative 
Law Against Political Control, 28 J.L. & POL. 129 (2013) (arguing that career staff in agencies may 
strategically disclose weaknesses in the positions that are imposed on them by political officials, 
thereby enabling outside litigants to challenge agency action more effectively); cf. Matthew C. 
Stephenson, A Costly Signaling Theory of “Hard Look” Judicial Review, 58 ADMIN. L. REV. 753, 755 
(2006) (arguing that the depth of the explanation offered by the agency in litigation is a signal that 
informs the court how important the policy is to the agency). 
110 See Watts, supra note 24, at 6-7 (discussing the ongoing debate in administrative law about 
whether courts should consider naked political reasons to be sufficient to support agency action). 
111 See supra Section III.A. The effectiveness of these checks also depends on an important and 
somewhat unsettled question about whether review of inaction claims for arbitrariness (when it is 
available) extends only to the stated reasons provided by the agency for declining to act, or whether 
it also allows courts to examine the factual predicates underlying the inaction and determine for 
themselves whether the agency is shirking its duties. If APA inaction review extends only to the 
reasons agencies give, courts would have difficulty reading the subtext, and would therefore be less 
effective in targeting cases. 
112 See Sunstein & Vermeule, supra note 93, at 195 (“[A]gencies must obey a more general 
anti-circumvention principle. Although it is neither necessary nor sufficient, the word ‘shall’ is a good 
indicator that agencies are constrained in their ability to defer decisions, certainly for lengthy periods 
of time. In other cases, the statutory scheme will best be read to contain an implicit, but necessary and 
unavoidable, command that agencies must make a determination one way or another . . . .”). 
113 See, e.g., ROBERT A. KATZMANN, JUDGING STATUTES 97 (2014) (discussing a survey of 
legislators which concluded that members of the legislature were unaware of judicial opinions 
concerning technical aspects of statutes, but were aware of “decisions on broad, policy-oriented 
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Congress may ultimately still prefer to avoid mandatory language for political 
reasons, the nearly guaranteed judicial review when Congress uses mandatory 
language, such as “shall enforce” and the like, provides incentives for 
Congress to be specific in legislation.114 In the end, it seems that APA inaction 
review could very well augment the political process controls that scholars such 
as Andrias, Love, and Garg advocate for, using newer, untested institutions and 
processes.115 Thus, even if political process controls are the best way to 
constrain purposive presidential inaction, there is still a good case to be made 
that courts can reinforce these controls through the use of the APA. 
Finally, because courts invalidating agency action or inaction will often 
simply remand to the agency for further consideration,116 challenges based on 
procedural violations or the arbitrary and capricious standard will often be 
less intrusive to the executive branch than an invalidation of the same 
behavior under a constitutional rule or standard. Agencies whose actions or 
inactions are remanded can often return to the drawing board and re-emerge 
having made the same substantive policy choices, albeit under different 
justifications, evidence, and reasoning. This is not the case with constitutional 
review, which casts much more of a pallor over an entire policy area when the 
courts vacate the agency’s action. 
The arbitrariness approach to the problem of nonenforcement of the law 
is powerful because it is a flexible standard that gives courts, agencies, 
Congress, and even the President the ability to work out context-specific 
solutions to what is, at root, a thorny problem of public administration. 
2. Comparative Virtues 
My claim is not merely that review under the APA is preferable on its 
own substantive merits to any other proposal currently on the table under the 
Take Care Clause, but also that APA review has the built-in features necessary 
 
issues of statutory interpretation”); Abbe R. Gluck & Lisa Schultz Bressman, Statutory Interpretation 
from the Inside—An Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons: Part I, 65 
STAN. L. REV. 901, 940-41 (2013) (conducting a survey of congressional staffers and finding a 
variance in awareness and understanding of the different canons of statutory interpretation 
employed by courts). 
114 See Dunlop v. Bachowski, 421 U.S. 560, 567 (1975) (finding that when there is no express 
statutory prohibition of judicial review, there is a strong presumption that Congress did not intend 
to prohibit judicial review of an agency action). 
115 See supra Section I.B. 
116 See, e.g., Kristina Daugirdas, Evaluating Remand Without Vacatur: A New Judicial Remedy for 
Defective Agency Rulemakings, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 278, 297 (2005) (surveying and assessing the D.C. 
Circuit’s application of the remand without vacatur remedy); Ronald M. Levin, “Vacation” at Sea: 
Judicial Remedies and Equitable Discretion in Administrative Law, 53 DUKE L.J. 291, 298-99 (2003) 
(discussing why many courts have elected to remand unlawful agency rules for further consideration 
without vacating that rule in the interim). 
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to make such a flexible standard possible in the face of the judicial capacity 
problem. That is, it is the only realistic approach to the constitutional problem 
here. When compared with a freestanding constitutional cause of action,117 a 
cause of action brought under the APA gives reviewing courts several 
important “outs” that help preserve both institutional capacity and capital. 
With respect to institutional capacity, my argument centers on the existence 
of jurisdictional and doctrinal safety valves that enable courts to quickly and 
easily filter out cases that do not raise substantial claims. With respect to 
institutional capital, my argument relies on the legitimizing effects of reliance 
on these “passive virtues” in a delicate separation-of-powers arena.118 
a. Jurisdictional Safety Valves 
If courts are going to impose any potent constraints on purposive 
executive inaction, they need to have plenty of safety valves, and the 
framework for litigation under the APA provides them in bulk. For instance, 
 
117 In many cases, the APA would be the vehicle for any constitutional claim because the APA 
provides a general cause of action for review of federal questions arising from agency action or 
inaction. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2012). Yet that is not always the case, especially in the context of the 
separation of powers. In a number of separation-of-powers cases, the cause of action for the 
constitutional claim did not come from the APA, but rather was derived from a right to relief based 
in the equitable power of courts to remedy violations of the “structural Constitution.” See, e.g., Kent 
Barnett, To the Victor Goes the Toil—Remedies for Regulated Parties in Separation-of-Powers Litigation, 
92 N.C. L. REV. 481, 495-96 (2014) (“The Court has suggested (if not held) that regulated parties 
have ‘implied private right[s] of action directly under the Constitution . . . under the Appointments 
Clause or separation-of-powers principles’ . . . .”); Aziz Z. Huq, Standing for the Structural 
Constitution, 99 VA. L. REV. 1435, 1443-45 (2013) (highlighting cases where individual litigants 
brought equitable separation-of-powers claims on the grounds that legislation violated the 
constitutional structure). For instance, in the recent Public Company Accounting Oversight Board 
(PCAOB) case, the Supreme Court, in a footnote, dismissed the government’s contention that there 
was no “implied private right of action directly under the Constitution to challenge governmental 
action under the Appointments Clause or separation-of-powers principles.” Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. 
Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 491 n.2 (2010). In the recess appointments case, Noel 
Canning v. NLRB, the D.C. Circuit found it had jurisdiction over an action to vindicate the structural 
constitution where any statutory review was waived, and the Supreme Court tacitly endorsed that 
approach. 705 F.3d 490, 497 (D.C. Cir. 2013), aff ’d, 134 S. Ct. 2550 (2014). The court relied on the 
fact that the questions at issue “go to the very power of the Board to act and implicate fundamental 
separation of powers concerns.” Id. Finally, some rare cases may also be pled as Bivens actions for 
damages stemming from constitutional violations, Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the 
Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), and those cases would likewise not entail these 
additional jurisdictional limitations. All of this is to say that any constitutional standard against 
nonenforcement could, in theory, be brought as a freestanding constitutional cause of action rather 
than tagged onto an APA claim. It follows that none of the specific benefits identified below would 
attach to such cases. 
118 See Sharon B. Jacobs, The Administrative State’s Passive Virtues, 66 ADMIN. L. REV. 565, 567 
(2014) (describing “passive virtues” as tools used by courts to dispose of cases before reaching and 
deciding on the merits). Of course, Professor Jacobs borrows the term “passive virtues” from 
Alexander Bickel. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 111 (1986). 
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a potential litigant needs to not only make a prima facie case that judicial 
review is not precluded under section 701(a)(1) or section 701(a)(2) of the 
APA,119 but also must show that the action (or inaction) represents a “final” 
agency action.120 Because this determination often turns on how a court 
characterizes the stability of any nonenforcement decision, it is in practice 
easy for courts to decide that an agency action is sufficiently provisional to 
avoid jurisdiction. As a practical matter, it is far more difficult to establish 
that an inaction is final than that an action is final, as agencies can simply 
argue that they are saying “not now” rather than “not ever.”121 Thus, the 
requirement of final agency action is an extremely useful filter, 
notwithstanding the fact that the APA formally equates agency action and 
inaction.122 Another important safety valve that applies in the administrative 
law context is prudential standing.123 Establishing that a general member of 
the public suffering from some nonenforcement of the law against a third 
party is within the “zone of interests” intended to be protected by the statute 
is a substantial burden because “increasing the regulatory burden on others” 
is not sufficient.124 Courts can easily avoid reviewing most cases by using any 
of these safety valves, which preserves their institutional capacity to handle 
the most important inaction cases, not to mention all of the other matters 
that federal courts must attend to. 
In an area where there are very legitimate concerns about judicial review 
for the strain it can impose on agencies as they make important resource 
allocation decisions, a kind of judicial review that allows courts to pick and 
choose their battles is really the only kind of judicial review that could work. 
Structural constitutional litigation, in contrast, does not require anything like 
a “final” agency action and relaxes the requirement that plaintiffs need to be 
the intended beneficiaries of a statutory program. Provided a plaintiff could 
 
119 See supra Section III.A. 
120 See, e.g., FTC v. Standard Oil Co. of Cal., 449 U.S. 232, 238-41 (1980) (elaborating on a 
flexible, “pragmatic” approach to determining whether agency action is final); Belle Co. v. U.S. 
Army Corps of Eng’rs, 761 F.3d 383, 389-90 (5th Cir. 2014) (finding that finality of agency action 
requires the “consummation of the agency’s decisionmaking process” and the action to be one with 
“legal consequences”), vacated, 136 S. Ct. 2427 (2016) (mem.). The suit must also satisfy the closely 
related issue of whether the controversy is “ripe” for judgment. See Sierra Club v. Yeutter, 911 F.2d 
1405, 1417-19 (10th Cir. 1990) (using the two-pronged test—fitness for judicial resolution and 
hardship to parties—to determine if an issue was ripe for adjudication). 
121 See generally Sunstein & Vermeule, supra note 93 (discussing the legality of agency deferrals 
and the potential consequences). 
122 See supra notes 71–73 and accompanying text. 
123 See Clarke v. Sec. Indus. Ass’n, 479 U.S. 388, 395-96 (1987) (requiring that, for the plaintiff to 
have standing, the “interest sought to be protected by the complainant” fall “within the zone of interests 
to be protected or regulated by the statute or constitutional guarantee in question” (internal quotation 
marks omitted) (quoting Ass’n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153 (1970))). 
124 Delta Constr. Co. v. EPA, 783 F.3d 1291, 1300 (D.C. Cir. 2015). 
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establish constitutional standing and could clear relatively low federal 
question jurisdiction hurdles, federal courts would inevitably be drawn into 
the merits in cases alleging even the most insignificant nonenforcement 
decisions. Courts would have difficulty maintaining any kind of stringency of 
review with so few defenses at their disposal.125 
b. Doctrinal Safety Valves 
In addition to the jurisdictional safety valves, the doctrine of APA review 
of agency inaction itself contains built-in mechanisms that allow courts to 
selectively apply more or less stringent arbitrariness review, depending on 
how the factual context is characterized. 
i. The Artificial Action/Inaction Distinction 
Although Section III.A took issue with those who dismiss the potency of 
APA inaction review, there is clearly an important difference in the stringency 
of review between cases involving inaction and cases involving action. 
Despite the fact that this distinction is somewhat metaphysical and in fact 
runs up against the language of the APA,126 the diverging treatments of these 
two doctrinal categories afford courts a useful tool. How a case is framed can 
make all of the difference. If courts want to increase the stringency of review, 
they may be able to characterize the inaction at issue as stemming from a 
conscious policy choice that functions more as an action than as an instance 
of inaction. 
To some extent, Professor Price’s dueling presumptions127 can do the same 
work as the inaction doctrine under the APA: a court can pivot between 
characterizing an instance of inaction as a “prospective” decision that looks more 
like a policy or rule of general application and characterizing it as a one-off 
enforcement decision based on contextual factors such as resource constraints or 
equity. It can thereby selectively apply more stringent review when warranted 
and less stringent review when appropriate. The problem with Price’s approach 
is that his category of “prospective” decisions is still too large. Too many cases 
could plausibly fit into his presumption against the constitutionality of 
prospective decisions. In contrast, the distinction between action and inaction in 
the APA context is conceptualized more as a continuum, giving the courts even 
more flexibility. Price’s approach is not so much wrong as it is too rigid. 
 
125 Perhaps courts would develop a Heckler-esque framework in the constitutional setting. 
Setting aside the fact that courts would have no clear authority to develop an elaborate constitutional 
common law of reviewability, it still would beg the question of why the courts would want to reverse 
engineer constitutional review to get what they already have under the APA. 
126 See supra Section III.A. 
127 See supra note 41 and accompanying text. 
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ii. The Flexibility of Arbitrariness Review 
Perhaps the best arrow in the judiciary’s quiver is the sliding scale of 
deference, which oscillates between extreme deference and “hard look” review 
depending on the circumstances. Once procedural hurdles are cleared and 
cases of inaction become reviewable, the substantive standards governing 
review provide for flexibility in the stringency of review based on the 
importance of resource allocation in that class of decisions.128 Legal doctrine 
under the APA indicates that one-off enforcement decisions (the kind that are 
a dime a dozen in the administrative state) are presumptively unreviewable 
because they implicate delicate resource allocation decisions, but as the agency 
inaction at issue becomes more generally applicable (and therefore more 
important), the deference afforded in practice declines to reflect the relatively 
lower burden on resource allocation that would likely be imposed.129 
Of course, variation in the stringency of arbitrariness review is not 
necessarily unique to the inaction context. Empirical scholarship shows that 
arbitrariness review is at least partly driven by extralegal factors, such as the 
partisanship of the judge.130 But the relative importance of resource allocation 
in the context of agency inaction introduces another variable that, in practice, 
allows courts to exercise exceedingly lenient review in the vast majority of 
cases, but to ramp up that review in precisely those cases where the gravest 
constitutional concerns are at play (i.e., prospective nonenforcement 
decisions). Indeed, the case law is consistent with courts stepping in and 
heightening the stringency of review in the most important cases.131 The 
Supreme Court rarely entertains inaction cases (even those where the lower 
court exercised review), and when it does enter the fray, as in Massachusetts v. 
EPA or in Mach Mining v. EEOC, it typically sides against agencies’ claims of 
categorical deference.132 
Professor Vermeule argues that jurisprudential structures called “grey 
holes”133 are pervasive in administrative law. Grey holes are doctrines that 
 
128 See Biber, supra note 31, at 51 tbl.1 (illustrating the sliding scale of judicial deference given 
to different types of agency action depending on the agency’s resource allocation). 
129 See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 527, 534 (2007) (acknowledging that an agency has 
broad discretion in allocating resources, but concluding that in certain situations the courts can still 
find certain agency inaction arbitrary and capricious). 
130 See Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, The Real World of Arbitrariness Review, 75 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 761, 767-68 (2008) (discussing the results of a statistical analysis of voting patterns in 
arbitrariness cases and finding pervasive partisan effects). 
131 See infra Part IV. 
132 See infra Part IV. 
133 See Adrian Vermeule, Our Schmittian Administrative Law, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1095, 1096 
(2009) (“Grey holes . . . arise when ‘there are some legal constraints on executive action . . . but the 
constraints are so insubstantial that they pretty well permit government to do as it pleases.’” (quoting 
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appear to provide legal standards for the judicial resolution of cases, but in 
practice break down in important cases.134 Typically, these grey holes augment 
the power of the President in emergency contexts in which the courts lack the 
capacity to engage the President.135 Here we have what might be called a 
“reverse grey hole”—one that diminishes the authority of the sovereign (the 
President) in the “exceptional” case. The presumption of unreviewability sets 
the default rule,136 but the increasingly stringent review as cases become more 
prospective, more important, and less likely to seriously interfere with 
delicate resource allocation decisions allows courts to involve themselves in 
the merits of the most important inaction cases137—precisely the ones that, 
because of their salience and policy importance, are most likely to raise 
constitutional concerns about the separation of powers. Indeed, in the wake 
of Massachusetts v. EPA, some commentators noted the fact that the Court 
simultaneously claimed to apply a highly deferential standard of review but 
actually conducted an extraordinarily probing form of review.138 These 
commentators typically dismissed the importance of the case, chalking the 
result up to the policy salience of the case.139 But that is precisely why we 
should not dismiss cases like Massachusetts v. EPA: it is the fact that such 
stringent review is exceptional that gives the courts the power to influence 
the balance of powers. 
IV. DEMONSTRATING THE POWER OF THE APA APPROACH 
So far, I have shown that, despite considerable anxiety about what policy-
oriented presidential inaction means for the separation of powers and the rule 
of law, scholars have looked away from the courts for a remedy. This reluctance 
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regulating greenhouse gases and noting the dissonance with precedent of a more deferential review). 
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to assign the judiciary a role stems, I argue, from a generally correct intuition 
that the courts are institutionally ill-equipped to serve as a meaningful check 
on the President because of the nature and characteristics of the judicial 
branch.140 But I have just shown in the preceding Part that the administrative 
law of agency inaction has features that make it an exception to this basic rule. 
As such, judicial review under the APA can and does provide the meaningful 
assurance against presidential overreach that has so far been missing from the 
largely theoretical debates on the issue. In sum, I self-consciously make a sort 
of Goldilocks argument: APA inaction review is well positioned to address 
purposive presidential inaction because its jurisdictional and doctrinal safety 
valves allow courts to avoid becoming too involved in most cases of individual 
inaction, freeing up the courts to implement a flexible style of review in 
precisely those cases that involve the greatest overreach or abdication by the 
executive branch—i.e., where inaction is being used in a sweeping or 
formalized manner to achieve larger policy aims that depart from statutory 
requirements. In other words, the “ideal” judicial enforcement is 
presumptively lax but at times capable of showing teeth. APA review provides 
that “just right” amount of oversight. 
In order to show how APA review is “just right,” it is perhaps helpful to 
examine a few illustrative cases where the courts have asserted themselves in 
measured ways. The cases I discuss in this Part show courts not only wading 
deep into potential interbranch conflicts over presidential inaction, but also 
triggering a relatively muted response and little contest from the White 
House. One could attempt to explain away these cases by asserting that 
Presidents Bush and Obama did not really care about the outcomes in these 
cases, but that explanation would directly conflict with the evidence. These 
cases touch upon what were—and still are—hot-button, salient policy 
questions. By all indications, the President simply appears to have been 
constrained in each case. One could likewise attempt to explain away these 
cases by essentially arguing that they are somewhat exceptional. Indeed, they 
are. That is precisely what gave the cases their power. 
A. Massachusetts v. EPA 
One of the most dramatic instances of judicial involvement in purposive 
presidential inaction came in a challenge to the EPA’s refusal to regulate 
motor vehicle emissions of carbon dioxide as an air pollutant under the Clean 
Air Act. In 2007, the Supreme Court held that the EPA’s rejection of a 
 
140 See POSNER & VERMEULE, supra note 21, at 52-53 (looking at features of the courts, like 
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petition for rulemaking asking the agency to promulgate an emissions rule 
was arbitrary and contrary to law.141 In doing so, the Court rejected the EPA’s 
(and presumably the Bush Administration’s) more pragmatic reasons for not 
granting the petition.142 Instead, it insisted that if the agency were to decline 
to act, “its reasons for action or inaction must conform to the authorizing 
statute.”143 That is to say, the EPA would have to make a scientific judgment 
about whether carbon dioxide emissions “cause, or contribute to, air pollution 
which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare.”144 
The decision received a great deal of attention in the media, primarily for 
its implications for the policy debates over the United States’ response to the 
threat of global climate change, and it has paved the way for an extensive 
effort by the EPA—with the active support of President Obama—to address 
climate change under the Clean Air Act. What is surprising, though, is (1) how 
infrequently the media and political response to the decision has been framed 
as a possible judicial affront to presidential responsibilities, and (2) how muted 
President Bush’s response was to an apparent limitation on his authority. 
On the first point, the Supreme Court seemed to anticipate that many 
would criticize the Court for overstepping its institutional role, stating, “To 
the extent that this constrains agency discretion to pursue other priorities of 
the Administrator or the President, this is the congressional design.”145 Either 
that simple nod to Congress was entirely convincing or there simply was no 
real concern among relevant political actors or the media about the obvious 
separation-of-powers concerns at issue in the case, because there were few 
complaints couched in those terms. The opinion was a major policy loss for 
the President. Early in his presidency, George W. Bush had built a significant 
amount of his policy agenda around appeasing energy and automobile 
industries and assuring them that he was in no rush to address climate change. 
One would think, then, that the President, not being constrained by the threat 
of judicial review, would resist the Supreme Court’s directions in Massachusetts 
v. EPA. But that is not at all what happened. Almost immediately, Bush issued 
Executive Order 13,432 calling on agencies to cooperate to regulate greenhouse 
gas emissions from mobile sources,146 and then began preparing formal 
judgments that not only provided a reasoned decision based on statutory 
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language (all that the Court’s decision required), but also came to the 
conclusion that greenhouse gas emissions endangered public welfare.147 
Although much of the real progress on climate change came after the Obama 
Administration took over in 2009, there is no other way to read the evidence 
than to suggest that the Bush Administration basically, and almost 
immediately, accepted defeat at the hands of the Supreme Court. 
B. Mach Mining v. EEOC 
In a recent case involving the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission (EEOC) and its duty to attempt conciliation before suing 
employers, the Supreme Court again rebuked a presidential administration 
for its approach to enforcement of statutory programs.148 At issue in the case 
was the EEOC’s alleged refusal to negotiate in good faith with an employer 
before formally bringing an employment discrimination suit. Under Title VII 
of the Civil Rights Act, the EEOC must attempt to resolve complaints 
through conciliation before proceeding to sue,149 which requires the agency 
to follow an elaborate program of steps.150 However, in recent years, the Obama 
Administration had come under some fire for allegedly coordinating an informal 
policy not to attempt conciliation.151 In Mach Mining, the EEOC attempted to 
defend its decisions not to enforce the conciliation framework by arguing that the 
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APA precluded judicial review of enforcement decisions where there is no law to 
apply to guide the courts.152 The Seventh Circuit agreed—breaking ranks with 
several other circuits—but the Supreme Court reversed its decision.153 Justice 
Kagan, writing for a unanimous Court, held that not only was the agency’s 
inaction reviewable,154 but the two letters to the defendant (one offering the 
possibility of conciliation processes and another stating that the “conciliation 
efforts . . . required by law have occurred and have been unsuccessful”155) were 
insufficient to justify the agency’s decisionmaking.156 On the first holding, the 
Court hardly made a passing analysis of the government’s contention that Heckler 
precluded review, and did not even have to resort to its anti-abdication 
exception.157 Instead, the Court found ample “law to apply” in the guidance and 
mandatory tone of the Civil Rights Act, even though the practice of conciliation 
goes to the very heart of what Heckler termed “prosecutorial discretion.”158 And 
while the standard of review appears to be fairly deferential, generally requiring 
only a sworn affidavit from the agency saying that they attempted to conciliate,159 
the Court rejected sweeping notions that there is simply no role for the courts to 
play in supervising enforcement strategies at the EEOC.160 
Mach Mining is more difficult to interpret than the rather dramatic 
decision in Massachusetts v. EPA, particularly because the standard of review 
the Court adopted in Mach Mining is far from stringent and will likely be 
half-heartedly applied by many lower courts. But the fact that the Court so 
easily and emphatically rejected the Obama Administration’s claim that 
failure to conciliate was an unreviewable form of enforcement discretion 
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under Heckler is a case in point about how the Supreme Court can, and often 
does, step in and effectively mark territory in cases that go to the heart of 
how the executive branch operates. Moreover, just as in Massachusetts v. EPA, 
it is remarkable how muted the response to this case has been from both the 
President and the media. It remains to be seen whether the EEOC’s practices 
will actually change in response to the decision, but it is already observable 
that the President has decided not to openly criticize the Supreme Court’s 
assertion of authority on this issue. Further, I am aware of no commentary 
that has cast this dispute as bearing on important constitutional values of the 
separation of powers. All of this is very difficult to square with accounts that 
portray courts as either (a) irrelevant to or positively barred from entering 
inaction disputes through the APA or (b) incapable of doing so in a way that 
would not open the floodgates of litigation. Indeed, the Court seemed fully 
conscious of the potential for its decision to open the floodgates, but trudged 
forward nonetheless, perhaps aware that the APA’s review framework 
provides ample safety valves should courts find themselves in a quagmire. 
C. Texas v. United States 
To a great extent, it has been the controversy over President Obama’s 
executive (in)action on immigration that has inspired the recent surge in 
attention to the possible constitutional limits on the President’s nonenforcement 
discretion. It is also a case in point for how judges faced with unavoidable inaction 
problems bear enormous pressure to channel disputes through the APA 
framework (and away from Take Care Clause claims), even if they do feel there 
is a role to be played by the judiciary. 
In 2012, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) developed a 
program—the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program—to 
allow young people born in other countries but raised in the United States to 
apply for “deferred action status and employment authorizations.”161 In 2014, 
DHS issued a memorandum indicating that it would expand deferred action to 
individuals who (1) have a son or daughter who is a lawful permanent resident, 
(2) have resided in the United States continuously since before January 1, 2010, 
and (3) are not an “enforcement priority.”162 This memorandum, now known as 
the Deferred Action for Parents of Americans and Lawful Permanent Residents 
(DAPA) memorandum, also reserved a place for ad hoc discretion on the part of 
DHS, noting that an individual could be denied an application for deferred action 
if there were “other factors” that made deferred action “inappropriate.”163 A 
 
161 Texas v. United States, 86 F. Supp. 3d 591, 606 (S.D. Tex.), aff ’d, 809 F.3d 134 (5th Cir. 2015), 
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group of twenty-six states, concerned about what they saw as persistent 
underenforcement of immigration laws, filed suit alleging that DHS had violated 
the APA and the Take Care Clause in issuing the DAPA memorandum.164 
While the district court paid homage to the well-worn principle that the 
“Government’s enforcement priorities and . . . the Government’s overall 
enforcement plan are not readily susceptible to the kind of analysis the courts 
are competent to make,”165 it claimed that this principle did not resolve the 
case because “prosecutorial discretion . . . is not the true focus of the States’ 
legal attack.”166 The court ultimately framed the disputed DAPA 
memorandum not as inaction, but as a new action or policy (or, more 
pejoratively, executive “legislation”).167 It was able to in effect avoid Heckler 
by drawing a distinction between action and inaction: 
While the Court recognizes (as discussed above) that the DHS possesses 
considerable discretion in carrying out its duties under the [Immigration and 
Nationality Act], the facts of this case do not implicate the concerns 
considered by Heckler such that this Court finds itself without the ability to 
review Defendants’ actions. First, the Court finds an important distinction 
in two terms that are commonly used interchangeably when discussing 
Heckler’s presumption of unreviewability: “non-enforcement” and “inaction.” 
While agency “non-enforcement” might imply “inaction” in most 
circumstances, the Court finds that, in this case, to the extent that the DAPA 
Directive can be characterized as “non-enforcement,” it is actually affirmative 
action rather than inaction.168 
The district court doubted that Heckler “anticipated that such ‘non-enforcement’ 
decisions would include the affirmative act of bestowing multiple, otherwise 
unobtainable benefits upon an individual.”169 
The district court arguably twisted Heckler here,170 but even so, that 
illustrates the point: Heckler is much more twistable than it has been widely 
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portrayed to be.171 One can perhaps characterize nearly any series of decisions 
that result in underenforcement of the law as either inaction or action, thereby 
applying or avoiding Heckler’s presumption of unreviewability as a court 
deems needed. Nothing would prevent this very same court from 
characterizing another policy in a future case as a mere series of prosecutorial 
decisions, or as mere guidelines for field officers. Indeed, that is what the 
courts usually do. What is different about the Texas case is the importance of 
the issue to larger policy debates and its potential threat to constitutional 
separation-of-powers values. Ultimately, the judge in Texas was able to rely 
on APA review as the basis for (a) finding the case reviewable and (b) issuing 
an opinion checking the President’s assertion of power—all while avoiding a 
constitutional showdown. Because all of the parties apparently conceded that 
the DAPA memorandum was a “rule,” the judge simply held that the rule was 
procedurally invalid because it had not gone through the APA section 553 
notice-and-comment rulemaking processes.172 
The appellate aftermath of the district court’s decision in Texas is 
somewhat difficult to interpret, but it is largely consistent with courts’ 
recognition of the comparative virtues of APA review. With hardly a mention 
of the Take Care Clause question,173 the Fifth Circuit upheld the preliminary 
injunction on the grounds that the DAPA memorandum was “much more 
than nonenforcement” and would “affirmatively confer ‘lawful presence’ and 
associated benefits on a class of unlawfully present aliens.”174 Because the 
memorandum was more than a policy statement or interpretive rule,175 the 
court held that the states were likely to succeed on the merits of their 
procedural APA claim. After the Obama Administration successfully 
petitioned for certiorari,176 popular coverage of the case emphasized the 
novelty and importance of the Take Care Clause question, which both lower 
courts had teased but avoided.177  Yet there were early hints that the Supreme 
Court would not reach the Take Care Clause issue. Overall, the briefing—
particularly that of the respondent, the State of Texas—focused on the relatively 
 
171 See supra Section III.A. 
172 Texas v. United States, 86 F. Supp. 3d at 671. 
173 Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134, 146 n.3 (5th Cir. 2015), aff ’d by an equally divided court, 
United States v. Texas, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016) (mem.) (per curiam). 
174 Id. at 166. 
175 Id. at 170-71, 176 (citing 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(A)). 
176 United States v. Texas, 136 S. Ct. 906 (2016) (mem.); see also Lyle Denniston, U.S. Appeals on 
Immigration Policy, SCOTUSBLOG (Nov. 20, 2015, 10:13 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2015/11/u-s-
appeals-on-immigration-policy/ [https://perma.cc/92J9-HUSJ] (discussing the appeal of Texas v. 
United States). 
177 See Peter M. Shane, The U.S. Supreme Court’s Big Immigration Case Wasn’t About Presidential 
Power, ATLANTIC (June 28, 2016), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/06/us-v-texas-
wasnt-really-about-presidential-power/489047/ [https://perma.cc/F4C6-84WF]. 
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mundane questions of administrative law rather than unhinged constitutional 
analysis.178 And the Take Care Clause did not make even a passing appearance in 
oral argument before the Court.179 The Supreme Court’s one-sentence per 
curiam opinion affirming the judgment by an equally divided court180 may give 
the appearance that the Take Care Clause issue is still alive, but it bears 
mentioning that no court to have considered the issue has yet given any indication 
of doing more than mentioning the underlying constitutional concerns.181 There 
is no reason to think that will change on remand to the district court, and by the 
time the case returns to the Supreme Court (if it does), the high political 
controversy over immigration and executive power may well have passed.     
None of this should be surprising. Once courts have found Heckler 
inapplicable or have rebutted the presumption of unreviewability in some 
way, they can ultimately stop presidential inaction in its tracks by using the 
full panoply of administrative law protections rather than by questioning the 
constitutional merits of the inaction. This ability to draw on seemingly minor 
procedural deficiencies to stop agency inaction is a powerful tool and gives 
the courts substantial leverage, particularly because it is difficult for 
Presidents to argue against such procedural deficiencies in court. The Fifth 
Circuit’s opinion upholding the preliminary injunction reveals much about 
the covert power of the APA approach: the court noted that “DAPA was 
enjoined because the states seek an opportunity to be heard through notice 
and comment, not to have the judiciary formulate or rewrite immigration 
policy.”182 But that is precisely what the courts have done (for better or 
worse), and it is difficult to see how they could have done it any other way. 
D. Discussion 
These three cases are not intended to definitively answer the question of 
whether courts can successfully marshal the tools available to them under the 
APA to police purposive presidential inaction. Because the cases focus on 
instances where the courts limited the asserted executive authority to 
underenforce the law, they can say nothing about how often courts use the 
safety valves identified in Section III.B, nor anything about how much 
institutional capacity and capital is reaped when courts exercise the passive 
virtues. But this much is clear: they show the fruits of that aggregate behavior by 
revealing unexpected, often subtle, exercises of judicial power. In other words, 
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they are sufficient to suggest that the courts derive actual authority in this domain 
of cases, especially in high-profile cases where executive overreach is most 
obvious and where other approaches to the problem seem the most intractable. 
Perhaps the best illustration of exactly what the APA framework does for 
the courts in this interbranch terrain comes in a thought experiment involving 
any of these cases. Would it even be imaginable that the Court could have 
addressed the Bush Administration’s inaction on climate change using 
separation-of-powers principles alone? Can we even fathom the level of 
hostility and pushback that would have occurred were a district court in Texas 
to rest its decision on the Take Care Clause claims in Texas v. United States? 
How would this kind of review actually play out, in terms of both legal 
formalities and constitutional politics? 
The complexity and uncertainty surrounding the administrative law of 
agency inaction insulates the courts and softens the edge of the knife without 
entirely sacrificing a role for the judiciary. It is a tool that will probably not 
fully satisfy formalist critics of the practice of presidential inaction, but one 
that should be recognized by functionalist scholars. 
CONCLUSION 
I have started with the premise that there are legitimate reasons to be 
worried about the constitutional and rule-of-law implications of purposive 
presidential inaction. I have argued that, rather than abdicating entirely, 
courts can and do use the administrative law of agency inaction to translate 
constitutional separation-of-powers concerns into a doctrinal framework that 
poses fewer threats to the capacity of courts and is more effective when courts 
do decide to intervene. Knowing that courts can and in fact do intervene 
should appease both formalist and functionalist critics of purposive 
presidential inaction, and perhaps it will obviate the need to develop 
unproven political process controls on the exercise of executive discretion. 
There is nothing wrong with the aspirational constitutional debate taking 
place around the Take Care Clause. Indeed, that debate will likely continue to 
inform the development of APA review of agency inaction. Sometimes, though, 
the simplest and best solution is the one you already know and use. Certainly the 
federal courts, which are focused on persuasively resolving disputes and 
preserving their own institutional vitality and prestige, will continue along the 
APA path as long as they can before diving into the constitutional thicket. 
